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10. Civil society and reconciliation in 
the Western Balkans: great  
expectations?
Denisa Kostovicova
Introduction
The perspective of European membership for the countries of the Western Balkans was 
envisaged by the EU as an incentive for reconciliation in the region. Transitional jus-
tice, denoting the response of states and societies to the legacy of war crimes, provides 
an insight into the nature of political transformation in a post-conflict context. Ten 
years after the Thessaloniki Declaration, however, a paradox is evident. Approximation 
of Western Balkan states to the EU through deepening of contractual relations has not 
been accompanied by reconciliation among states and societies in the region. 
In the decade that has passed since Thessaloniki, the question of accountability for 
war crimes has featured prominently in the public debate. This debate has taken place 
both within and between Western Balkan states owing to civil society groups that have 
spearheaded societal reconciliation efforts. Their advocacy has paved the way for of-
ficial initiatives aimed at addressing war crimes, such as apologies by some countries’ 
leaders. Nonetheless, accountability for mass atrocities remains one of the most fiercely 
contested issues, nationally and regionally. 
There is no consensus on the causes and nature of the violence committed on the territo-
ry of the former Yugoslavia, or on the appropriate redress for past wrongs. Consequent-
ly, all ethnic groups tend to see themselves primarily as victims and not as perpetrators, 
while war crimes continue to be politicised and instrumentalised. Since the cessation of 
hostilities these attitudes have been perpetuated by the unintended effects of various 
international and domestic transitional justice mechanisms, rather than by the absence 
of such mechanisms. These include both retributive justice, which is focused on trials 
and punishment of perpetrators, as well as restorative justice, which encompasses non-
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judicial victim-centred mechanisms, such as truth commissions, lustration, apologies 
and compensations, while aiming to restore social relations. 
Post-conflict reconciliation in the Western Balkans remains an aspiration that is key for 
meaningful democratisation and Europeanisation. Adopting a bottom-up perspective, 
this chapter assesses civil society’s role in advancing transitional justice in the region in 
the ten years that have passed since the Thessaloniki Declaration. It considers the EU’s 
belated support to civil society’s reconciliation efforts, as well as civil society’s contribu-
tion to transitional justice alongside internal constraints on its ability to promote ac-
countability for the crimes and abuse committed in the past.   
BACKGROUnD
The decade since the Thessaloniki Declaration has been marked by the EU’s increasing 
focus on civil society in the Western Balkans. This trend has been reflected in the EU’s 
strategic approach to the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the policy frame-
work for the EU’s pre-accession engagement with the region, and in its financial instru-
ments supporting the SAP goals. The EU’s aim to address ‘weak civil society’, noted 
at the beginning of the SAP, was driven by anticipated dividends for democratisation, 
Europeanisation and reconciliation. 
The EU’s initial approach, through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme, the EU’s financial instrument 
for the Western Balkans from 2002 to 2006, was that of enabling civil society through 
strengthening its capacities, rather than positioning it as a partner in the mutual project 
of approximation to the EU. Accordingly, civil society received a fraction of the total as-
sistance allocation, which was spread thinly over competing priorities. With some vari-
ation across different states, the necessity of tackling direct consequences of conflict, 
such as refugee integration, was balanced with projects aimed at supporting democrati-
sation and approximation.
The change from the CARDS to the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), 
which has channeled EU financial assistance to the SAP since 2007, signalled the EU’s 
changed understanding of the role of civil society in facilitating comprehensive trans-
formation en route to the EU. 
The 2007 Enlargement Strategy recognised the continued weakness of civil society in 
the countries of the region, making its development a policy priority in its own right. 
Civil society was accordingly repositioned as a partner in delivering policy goals of de-
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mocratisation, as an agent in cross-border collaboration and dialogue, and as a me-
diator bringing the EU project closer to the people. This approach was reflected in the 
increased allocation for civil society development under the IPA as compared to the 
CARDS. The establishment of the Civil Society Facility (CSF) in 2008, under the IPA, 
further streamlined funding for civil society development, specifically focusing on three 
strands: capacity-building, direct exposure of civil society to EU institutions through 
‘People 2 People’ programmes, and development of civil society networks. Also, the EU-
funded project Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations (TACSO) was set 
up, targeting the deficient capacity of civil society organisations in order to better enable 
them to participate in political processes. 
Nonetheless, the shift in the EU’s policy emphasis on civil society did not manage to re-
solve the tension between civil society development as an end in itself as opposed to civil 
society development as a means of approximation to the EU. The tension was ultimately 
resolved in favour of the latter, with civil society development guided by immediate pri-
orities of European integration. Such resolution has a practical and operational ration-
ale. The SAP, with its comprehensive reformist political and economic agenda, has served 
as the anchor of reforms enacted in the Western Balkan states. However, it also reflects 
the EU’s prioritisation of member state-building, which was applied to Central and East 
European candidates, as opposed to post-conflict state-building, which would entail a much 
broader reconstruction agenda for states and societies emerging from war. 
The resulting weaknesses of the narrowly-focused EU member-state building approach 
are illustrated by the EU’s belated support to civil society. The EU’s delay in reaching 
out to civil society in the Western Balkans was particularly evident in the case of civil so-
ciety initiatives aimed at furthering transitional justice and reconciliation. According to 
the EU’s logic, reconciliation would occur alongside the transformation of the Western 
Balkan countries as they moved towards EU membership, but the flaw in this logic was 
revealed by the persistent reluctance of the states and societies to confront their own 
nation’s role in the conflicts. 
STATE OF PLAY
Civil society’s contribution to reconciliation in the Western Balkans exemplifies the am-
biguous impact that the non-state sector has had on broader transitional processes, 
such as democratisation and Europeanisation, in the region. Civil society has been piv-
otal in putting the issues of the past mass atrocities and human rights violations on the 
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political agenda. Yet, at the same time, limited post-conflict reconciliation can also be 
understood in terms of the weaknesses of civil society itself. 
Progress: civil society’s contribution to post-conflict reconciliation
Since the opening up of the European perspective, civil society in the region has played 
several important roles. It has sought to promote public discussion of the accountabil-
ity for war crimes, influenced policy, and became an agent of transitional justice in its 
own right, both implicitly and explicitly. 
In its deliberative role, civil society throughout the region ought to be credited with 
putting  the issue of accountability for war crimes on the political agenda in the Western 
Balkans states where continuity between wartime and post-war authorities was condu-
cive to the ‘let’s forget and move on’ approach. Furthermore, the states and societies 
overwhelmingly used international criminal prosecutions to reassert their own sense of 
victimisation rather than accept culpability in conflicts where victims belonged to all 
ethnic groups. While exposing the responsibility of their own nations in the mass atroci-
ties, civil society groups were critical in delegitimising collective assumptions about vic-
timhood that stood in the way of facing up to war crimes. However, deliberation and 
discussion have not produced a consensus on how to address the legacy of mass atroci-
ties. Civil society in the Western Balkans has emerged as a vibrant space of dialogue and 
disagreement on a range of issues, such as the appropriateness of retributive vs. restora-
tive transitional justice mechanisms or whether national transitional justice initiatives 
should precede regional ones. 
In terms of influence on policy, civil society has simultaneously played an important 
role in compensating for state weakness. In the past decade, a growing number of do-
mestic prosecutions, including the transfer of cases from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in line with the ICTY’s planned closure, was 
accompanied by a number of challenges: politicisation and political interference, se-
lectivity based on the ethnicity of those indicted, alongside capacity-related problems, 
resulting in the slow processing of cases and the build-up of a backlog of cases, as well as 
an inadequate framework for witness protection. Accordingly, civil society has stepped 
in where the institutional capacity of states was lacking while continuing to perform a 
watchdog function in relation to policies awarding impunity, avoiding accountability 
and marginalising the victims of mass atrocities.
Lastly, civil society in the region has become an agent in transitional justice and reconcili-
ation in its own right, implicitly and explicitly. In the post-conflict context characterised 
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by fractured inter-ethnic relations, it became a bridge for establishing old and forging 
new contacts across the ethnic divide, whether inside countries or between countries. 
Particularly important in this respect have been civil society organisations working with 
young people, such as the Youth Initiative for Human Rights. Similarly, the emergence 
of regional civil society networks, like the Regional Women’s Lobby for Peace, Security 
and Justice in Southeastern Europe (RWL SEE), that cross national boundaries have – 
irrespective of their specific mandates and activities – been significant for the creation 
of a transnational social capital, as an aspect of reconciliation. 
In summary, civil society has ensured that the question of accountability for war crimes 
and mass human rights violations was put – and has remained – on the political agenda 
in the region. It has played an essential role in compensating for weak state capacity in 
the pursuit of post-conflict justice. Lastly, civil society has provided an alternative way 
of addressing past culpability. It emerged as a local response to the war crimes legacy as 
opposed to internationally-driven ones and as an answer to weaknesses of the top-down 
trial-oriented mechanisms of transitional justice, and as a transnational instrument 
overcoming the limitations of nationally-defined approaches.  
Challenges: constraints on civil society’s contribution to post-
conflict reconciliation 
Elusive reconciliation in the Western Balkans is also related to civil society’s weakness in 
terms of its own capacity, its relationship vis-à-vis the state and external donors, and its 
coherence as an actor. Furthermore, the impact of liberal civil society ought to be viewed 
in relation to illiberal political agendas of non-state actors and their activism. 
The emergence of prominent NGOs throughout the region, such as Documenta – 
Centre for Dealing with the Past in Croatia, as torchbearers of activism in the area of 
transitional justice and reconciliation, is actually, paradoxically though it may seem, an 
indicator of the weakness of the sector. An increase in registered civil society organisa-
tions in the Western Balkans, including those whose remit is directly related to advanc-
ing transitional justice, gives a misleading picture of civil society capacity. Not only are 
many organisations inactive, but also their weak capacity limits their impact. The latter 
is related to their lack of fundraising ability and expertise on complex policy issues, such 
as those related to criminal prosecutions, for example. However, even the most capable 
and active civil society organisations have been constrained to various degrees by the 
legal framework set out by Western Balkan states. 
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Furthermore, civil society’s lack of financial autonomy in a context where a state-society 
consensus on accounting for past crimes is lacking has shaped the activism of civil so-
ciety organisations and affected how their activism resonates with broader society. On 
the one hand, those NGOs which depend solely on the state, have in a number of cases 
become agents of the state’s rather than their own agendas. For example, some victims’ 
associations have ended up overlooking victims’ interests. On the other, those NGOs 
who turned to external sources of funding were open to criticism of not only rent-seek-
ing on the back of war crimes, but also of furthering agendas that were not seen to be 
‘authentic’. Such public perceptions affected their standing as a legitimate actor in a 
policy dialogue with the state. 
Despite efforts to bridge ethnic divisions, civil society in the Western Balkans is, by and 
large, a fragmented sphere, characterised both by ethnic segmentation and by prioritis-
ing national over transnational modes of activism. Therefore, the relative vibrancy of 
civil society activism as evidence of democratisation is offset by its ethnic nature. At the 
same time, many smaller grassroots projects, which question the mono-ethnic ortho-
doxy, such as the work of Future without Fear in Kosovo and the Macedonian Women’s 
Lobby, are often ignored by the media. A lack of opportunity for wider dissemination 
of cross-ethnic initiatives is another illustration of the contested, competitive and frag-
mented nature of civil society. Lastly, the national states have remained the primary 
framework for civil society activism, while a regional civil society initiative such as the 
Coalition for the Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts about War Crimes 
and other Serious Human Rights Violations in former Yugoslavia (RECOM) is an excep-
tion. The necessity of a regional approach to the transnational character of the Balkan 
wars is obvious given that perpetrators and victims often belonged to different states. 
Lastly, a range of civil society organisations and movements in the region, such as the 
Dveri Movement in Serbia, have emerged as purveyors of an exclusive ethnic national-
ism, combined with an anti-EU message. By and large, they are run by and attract the 
youth cohort. ‘New media savvy’, they repudiate their nation’s culpability with regard to 
war crimes and thus dismiss the criminal legacy of the past. Such public narratives that 
reject the criminal legacy and, with it, the notion of reconciliation, and that emanate 
from civil society, represent an additional constraint on the liberally-minded civil soci-
ety groups. Thus, civil society and its contribution to justice and reconciliation cannot 
be assessed separately from the broader environment in which it operates. It has faced 
an ‘illiberal alliance’ where segments of illiberal civil society have reinforced the reluc-
tance or resistance at the state level to address the issue of culpability. 
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PROSPECTS 
Direct engagement with and support of civil society organisations in the field of tran-
sitional justice and reconciliation in the Western Balkans has signalled a long-needed 
change in the EU’s policies. This suggests that the EU is beginning to accept civil society 
as a transitional justice actor in its own right. It also indicates that the EU may have 
come to appreciate the relevance of restorative mechanisms of transitional justice, which 
prioritise reconciliation and recognition of victims, as opposed to retributive judicial 
mechanisms, that have been criticised for their top-down and technocratic approach to 
post-conflict justice. Ten years after Thessaloniki, the debate about war crimes initially 
prompted by the ICTY, has been internalised in the Western Balkans, albeit without any 
consensus on either the cause(s), nature and consequences of violence, or the redress for 
past wrongs, within nations or regionally. 
Spurred by the EU’s recent policy approach, progress in cooperation between states and 
civil societies in the Western Balkans has advanced in many policy areas, but not in 
those that deal with the legacy of mass atrocities. Policies that lead to the recognition of 
the victims, whether related to war crimes trials, social policy such as welfare benefits, or 
even the issue of the missing, may be considered as an area where collaboration between 
the state and civil society should be actively promoted. 
Furthermore, the EU needs to focus on fostering a transnational dialogue in the di-
vided region through civil society support. This could be a strategy to ameliorate the 
structural weakness of civil society, i.e. its internal capacity, but also address exclusive 
ethnic viewpoints originating in the non-state sphere and fuelled by ethnic fragmenta-
tion. Therefore, reconciliation, in terms of creating opportunities for debate, for exam-
ple through work on school textbooks and student exchanges, might be considered. 
The EU’s origins are historically tied to the idea of peace through integration. The Euro-
pean project in the Western Balkans is also a response to the violence that accompanied 
the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and a deterrence strategy against its future re-
currence. Rather than sidelining the dimension of post-conflict state-building in favour 
of member state-building, the EU might consider how a more comprehensive support 
of reconciliation processes may advance approximation to the EU. The strengthening 
of civil society to deal with past atrocities is an investment in reconciliation, and, thus 
in the Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. 

